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 Annotation 
The aim of the work is to analyze the convergence in the Czech Republic for the period 
of 1996-2006. The paper is based primarily on the Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s theories of 
convergence of sub-national territorial units. The regression results proved assumptions to be 
realistic. 
The main model concentrates on a panel data approach that captures the extent to which 
new transport infrastructure influences within-nation regional convergence. 
This paper developed a regional approach to evaluate the impact of transport 
infrastructure, human capital and migration in four Central and Eastern European countries – the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic. The aim is to present an overview of 
the convergence process of the Czech regions between 1996 and 2006.  
A neoclassical growth model is used as a framework to study convergence across the 14 
administrative units of the Czech Republic. Data on gross value added per capita are exploited.  
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1. Introduction 
The issue of within-nation development paths has been extensively explored with regard 
to the US states, EU NUTS regions, Japanese prefectures, Canadian provinces and Australian 
states, where data are robust and widely available. Although the issue is higher on the agenda of 
developing and transition economies, there have been few studies that analyzed within-nation 
convergence in this type of countries, for example, in Central and Eastern Europe.  
The aim of the work is, therefore, to examine the occurrence of β-convergence in the 
Czech Republic, which is a middle income transition economy. The research questions are as 
follows: 
- What is the linkage between transport infrastructure, human capital and migration in 
closing the gap between leading and lagging regions? 
- What is the impact of economic structure on beta-convergence? 
The paper is organized as follows: section “Review of empirical literature” discusses 
theoretical and empirical analyses of the researched subject area; section “Development of 
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estimable model” presents the econometric model and approaches adopted; section “Data and 
descriptive statistics” explores various measures of convergence and other data; section 
“Estimation and economic interpretation” describes the analysis itself and presents the empirical 
results; and section “Conclusions” summarizes the findings.  
2. Review of empirical literature 
The theoretical foundations of these issues can mostly be found in endogenous growth 
theory, new economic geography and macro-economic literature.  
2.1.1. New Economic Geography 
 
The economic geography framework was developed by Masahisa Fujita, Paul Krugman, 
Anthony Venables, and others in the early 1990s, and deals with the link between infrastructure 
and economic activity. The spatial distribution of firms, labour and assets is added as an 
additional dimension, for infrastructure project means making rival decisions on the place that 
will serve limited number of users. Economic agents will behave according to the availability 
and quality of local infrastructure. 
In their book “Frontiers of the New Economic Geography” published in 2005, Masahita 
Fujita and Tomoya Mori explored the forces behind spatial concentration of economic activities. 
They distinguished “first” and “second nature”: “to some extent, economic activities are spatially 
concentrated because of dissimilarities in such natural features as rivers, harbors and mineral 
deposits, or “first nature”. However, the impact of the first nature on the spatial distribution of 
economic activities is not difficult to explain within the traditional economic theory based on 
competitive paradigm. Thus, the focus of this paper is on recent contributions to economic 
modeling of endogenous mechanisms (or second nature) leading to agglomeration.”1 
Increasing returns, often seen as arising from economies of scale or localised 
technological spillovers, generate a process of circular, cumulative causation leading to 
1 Fujita M., Mori T. ‘Frontiers of the new economic geography’. Papers in Regional Science, Institute of Developing 
economies 2005, P. 4 
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decreasing costs of production and increasing wages. This gives rise to a cumulative process of 
agglomeration and all industry and workers move to one region. The balance between 
agglomeration and dispersion is determined by transport costs.  
As they fall, both capital and labour will flow from small markets to richer regions with 
larger market sizes. The allowed factor mobility and subsequently increased agglomeration lead 
to the growth of competition and clustering. Altering factor mobility is critical for the prospects 
of poorer regions as public infrastructure investments in one location can draw production away 
from other locations or provide access to adjacent locations not previously accessible2. Boarnet 
(1998) shows that highway projects in California counties provide benefits to the investing 
counties at the expense of other counties within the state.  
Boarnet analyzed negative output spillovers from public infrastructure in a linear 
production-function framework and found that “when input factors are mobile, public 
infrastructure investments in one location can draw production away from other locations”3.  
2.1.2. Endogenous Growth 
The endogenous growth model emerged in the 1980s and emphasized that economic 
growth was a product of economic system rather than arisen from outside. 
In neoclassical growth models for closed economies, as presented by Ramsey (1928), 
Solow (1956), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965), the per capita growth rate tends to be 
inversely related to the starting level of output or income per person. In particular, if economies 
are similar in respect to preferences and technology, then poor economies grow faster than rich 
ones. 
Much of the empirical growth literature has evaluated growth theories by fitting 
regressions that relate the average growth rate of per-capita output over some time period for a 
sample of countries to initial per-capita output and country. 
2  Lall S., Yilmaz S., ‘Regional economic convergence: do policy instruments make a difference?’. World Bank 
Institute, Springer 2001, p.154 
3 Boarnet M.G., ‘Spillovers and locational effects of public infrastructure’. Journal of Regional Science, Wiley 
2002, abstract. 
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Alternatively, the mainstream endogenous growth models regard investment as an 
endogenous factor and technology as an exogenous one: disparities arising from differences in 
regional capital-to-labor ratios diminish over time and both trade and factor flows tend to 
equalize factor prices. Thereby, the theory anticipates unconditional long-run convergence, or 
conditional or club convergence. 
2.1.3. Macro-level Empirical Studies 
Macroeconometric research based on cross-country, cross-state or cross-region data has a 
number of drawbacks. One aspect that is relevant to infrastructure proxies is the fact that, as long 
as the variables used to capture some dimension of infrastructure are in fact aggregates of 
different underlying aspects with separate causal relationship with the outcome of interest, the 
aggregate estimated effect will depend on the arbitrary weights used to define the right-hand side 
proxy. This is especially relevant for public capital proxy, but may also affect physical 
indicators.  
Another flaw is that even when studies have been technically sound, the usual 
macroeconometric measures have suffered from inescapable limitations due to the nature of data. 
Combes and Lafourcade (2005) show that while simple time or distance measures do relatively 
well in a cross-section setting, they very imperfectly capture variations in transport costs in a 
time-series perspective. So, the problem is that they do not allow for the decomposition of the 
sources of variations in transport costs resulting from changes in the regulatory framework, the 
identity of operators (i.e. privatization) and the nature of the political economy process that 
drives investments (Straub 2007). The inclusion of such data could be used more systematically 
to analyze how the overall provision of infrastructure investments and the quality of services is 
affected by the above-mentioned aspects. The sectoral coverage should also be as inclusive as 
possible. For example, transport should not include only roads but also ports, airports, railways.  
At present, the private sector still represents a small share of overall infrastructure 
spending and it is not likely to grow substantially in the short term. 
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Other policy measures, such as tax breaks in the backward region, progressive income 
taxes and centralized wage setting with subsequent social transfers to the unemployed must be 
neutralized.  
2.2. Convergence 
There appear to be two main measures of economic convergence. These are the sigma (σ) 
convergence and beta (β) convergence. The β-convergence occurs when the partial correlation 
between growth in income over time and its initial level is negative.  
2.1.3. Unconditional β-convergence 
Unconditional (absolute) β-convergence is when poorer economies tend to grow faster 
than wealthier ones (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995, Sala-i-Martin 1996). The theoretical 
foundation for unconditional  β-convergence is the standard neoclassical growth model by Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (2004): 
(1/T) log(yit+T)/yit) = α – β log(yit) + εit,     (1) 
where yit = Yit/Yt is per capita GDP in the ith region relative to the average for the sample 
of regional economies under investigation, (1/T) log(yit+T)/yit is the annualized rate of growth of 
relative per capita GDP in the ith region over the study period between t and t+T, and log(yit) is 
the logarithm of relative per capita GDP in the ith region in the base year t. If 0 < β < 1, the data 
set is said to exhibit “absolute” β-convergence: there is a long-term tendency for per capita GDP 
to equalize across economies. The value of β measures the speed of the convergence process.  
Under certain conditions, a negative coefficient on initial level of regional GDP per 
capita may not imply a decrease in interregional income disparity, for example in a situation 
where poorer regions grow fast enough to overtake the richer regions. 
Another possible issue with this approach is the fact that the initial level of regional GDP 
per capita might be correlated with regional characteristics affecting growth. Regional 
characteristics are included and country-level (and later regional) fixed effects are added to 
control for this.  
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2.1.4. Conditional β-convergence 
Conditional β-convergence becomes relevant when regional economies are not 
structurally similar and welfare or output measures do not converge to the same level but the 
differences across regions become stationary and growth rates are the same in the long run. 
Martin and Sunley (1998) argue that it is necessary to hold the steady state of each economy 
constant in order to test for conditional β-convergence. One method of doing this is to introduce 
additional structural variables in the basic growth regression. This method was used by Barro 
(1991), and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992). 
2.2. Empirics 
An important question that has been addressed in the literature is to determine the more 
appropriate proxies for infrastructure. These have either been some measures of public capital – 
such as investment in infrastructure, generally from public sources although not exclusively – or 
physical indicators.  
There are at least two reasons why public capital figures are not very good proxies for 
infrastructure. Firstly, a significant part of investment in infrastructure is made by the private 
sector. Measuring infrastructure stocks using only public investment figures introduces 
systematic measurement errors and renders most estimates unreliable. Besides, the official costs 
of investments are often disconnected from their effective value, mostly because of 
governmental inefficiencies or institutional weaknesses (Prichett 1996). Secondly, infrastructure 
is often not a pure public good. In part because of its private sector origin, it is increasingly 
taking a private good nature and its services are being priced. 
Physical infrastructure proxies have also suffered from three main problems. Firstly, they 
are not systematically available across suitable geographical units and time. Secondly, the 
indicators currently used are often relatively bad proxies of the services they are supposed to 
capture. Thirdly, the quality dimension of infrastructure services, which appears crucial to 
private operators, is almost completely absent from these indicators. Finally, there is a 
dichotomy between maintenance and private capital durability on the one hand and the 
 10 
realization of new investments at the detriment of the existing stock on the other. New 
investments are preferred to maintenance for reasons that maintenance is tax-financed, while 
new investments rely on soft international loans, and new investments may have higher "political 
visibility" and shorter "horizon" than maintenance, which only has gradual effects on the quality 
of the infrastructure stock. 
It should be obvious that measuring infrastructure stocks using only public investment 
figures introduces systematic measurement errors and renders most estimations unreliable. 
2.2.5 Empirical Economic Geographic Studies 
The predictions of new economic geography models are as follows: infrastructure 
policies that facilitate interregional trade between leading and lagging areas will increase spatial 
concentrations of economic activity in leading areas. These policies will also increase growth in 
the whole economy while reducing nominal income inequalities between areas and between 
workers and capital owners. By contrast, infrastructure policies that improve connectivity within 
lagging areas may enhance local economic growth but can slow the growth of the whole 
economy (Baldwin, Forslid, martin, Ottaviano, and Robert-Nicoud 2003). 
2.2.6. New economic geography 
Depending on the “geographic scale”, the market forces to be harnessed or supported 
differ. At a smaller scale, for example, an area within a country (a province or state) – geography 
poses different challenges than at a larger geographic scale – say, a country. At an even larger 
geographic scale – say, a group of countries that form a geographic region – the market forces 
that work toward integration can be blocked by even greater geographic and political obstacles. 
Density is the most important dimension locally. Distances are short, and cultural and 
political divisions are few and shallow. The policy challenge is getting density right – harnessing 
market forces to encourage concentration and promote convergence in living standards between 
villages and towns and cities. But distance can be important as rapid urbanization leads to 
congestion, and divisions within cities can be manifest in slums and ghettoes. 
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Distance to density is the most important dimension at the national geographic scale. 
Distance between areas where economic activity is concentrated and areas that lag is the main 
dimension. The policy challenge is helping firms and workers reduce their distance from density. 
The main mechanisms are the mobility of labour and the reduction of transport costs through 
infrastructure investments. Divisions within countries – differences in language, currency, and 
culture – tend to be small. In Indonesia the potential profitability of firms in textiles and other 
sectors is negatively related to distance-to-density: more distance, less profit. This is true for 
distance-to-density within the country and for distance to an international port and thus to 
density in international markets. Again, lagging areas unable to attract investment and 
employment are those with a high distance-to-density. Besides, long distances raise transport 
costs and reduce factor mobility.  
Division is the most important dimension internationally. But distance and density are 
also relevant. Economic production is concentrated in a few world regions that are also the most 
integrated. Other regions, by contrast, are divided. While distance matters at the international 
level, for access to world markets, divisions associated with the impermeability of borders and 
differences in currencies and regulations are a more serious barrier than distance. Having a large 
and dynamic economy within the neighbourhood can help smaller countries, especially in 
regions distant from world markets.  
These three attributes of development – geographic unevenness, circular causation, and 
neighbourhood effects – have not always received much attention. They should, because they 
have radical implications for public policy. 
1. Geographic unevenness – the first attribute of development – implies that governments 
generally cannot simultaneously foster economic production and spread it out smoothly. 
2. Circular causation – the second attribute – provides hope for policy makers wishing to 
pursue progressive objectives. Rising concentrations of economic production are 
compatible with geographic convergence in living standards.  
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3. Neighbourhood effects – the third attribute – come with a principle for policy making: 
promote economic integration. Unevenness and circularity imply that it is more difficult 
for places left behind to catch up. But spillovers point to the promise for surmounting this 
handicap. Economic integration is an effective and the most realistic way to harness the 
immediate benefits from concentration to achieve the long-term benefits of convergence. 
Countries for the most part are free to determine their openness to the outside world. But 
geography and history produce divisions over which countries have little or no control. These 
include being landlocked, being in a remote location (especially if combined with small size), 
and having a high degree of ethnic or cultural heterogeneity within and across borders. 
The EU takes into consideration these dimentions. The EU regional or “cohesion” policy 
for the period 2007-2013 defines lagging areas as those qualifying for assistance under the 
“convergence objective”, equated with NUTS2 areas with a GDP per capita of less than 75 
percent of the EU average4. These areas are budgeted to receive around 71 percent of funds 
under the convergence objective. But, even in EU regional policy, funding is available on more 
favourable (and complicated) terms for those areas whose GDP per capita is not only less than 
75 percent of the EU average, but which are in a country whose GDP per capita is less than 90 
percent of the EU average. These areas are considered to be “more lagging”. 
Convergence targets include eliminating territorial disparities in economic development 
(economic cohesion) and in access to labour and income (social cohesion). This “cohesion” is 
matched by the EU regional policy, which allocates about 60 percent of its funding to support 
areas of low development (less than 75 percent of the EU average GDP per capita). 
Accounting for 35 percent of total spending of the EU, the EU cohesion policy is 
translated into practice through structural funds (90 percent of spending) and the cohesion fund 
(10 percent). The Agenda 2000 package comes with a price tag of Euro236 billion with Euro 195 
billion for structural funds. Agenda 2000’s objectives include the development and structural 
4 http://europa.eu/pol/reg/index_en.htm, “Activities of the European Union – Regional Policy” 
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adjustment of lagging areas, the development of border areas and areas industrial decline, and 
the adaptation and modernization of education and training systems. The cohesion policy aims to 
improve economic performance of specific areas and help them catch up with the rest of the 
union. 
Resource allocations of this scale to support integration may reflect the redistribution 
preference of member states, but do these policies stimulate overall growth? Are they paying for 
the “wrong” type of assets? Academic research shows that they are not well suited to 
maximizing aggregate economic growth because they try to promote spatial evenness and not 
agglomeration. Nor are they especially well suited to promoting catch-up by lagging areas. 
Traditional cohesion policies that provide “hard” infrastructure and assistance to firms are 
unlikely to increase the competetiveness of lagging areas. Moving away from these programs to 
support educational programs and institutional development could do much more. 
Relying solely on spatially targeted interventions is a common mistake. It is far better to 
rely on institutions that work less noisily. In France the concentration of economic mass and 
convergence of disposable incomes between leading and lagging areas have been concurrent, 
producing a “scissors effect” in the geographies of production and disposable income. The effect 
appears to be driven not by spatially focused interventions, but by spatially blind or “universal” 
progressive income taxation, social security, and unemployment benefits. Although space is not 
explicitly considered in such policies, their effects and outcomes can vary considerably across 
locations. As the base of economic integration, such “institutions” capture the benefits of spatial 
concentration of production and deliver convergence in living standards. 
There are three types of spatial policies: 
1. Institutions (spatially blind policies). The term is used here to categorize policies that 
are not explicitly designed with spatial considerations, but that have effects and 
outcomes that may vary across locations. These include such national policies as the 
income tax system, intergovernmental fiscal relations, and governance of land and 
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housing markets, as well as education, health care, basic water and sanitation, and 
other government initiatives. 
2. Infrastructure (spatially connective policies). The term is used here as shorthand to 
include all investments that connect places and provide basic business services, such 
as public transportation and utilities. These include developing interregional 
highways and railroads to promote trade in goods – and improving information and 
communication technologies to increase the flow of information and ideas.  
3. Incentives (spatially focused policies). The term is used here to include spatially 
targeted measures to stimulate economic growth in lagging areas. These include 
investment subsidies, tax rebates, location regulations, local infrastructure 
development, and targeted investment climate reforms, such as special regulations for 
export processing zones. 
The experience of the EU and the United States in addressing spatial equity with aspatial 
tax system is constructive. Skeptics might counter that the coverage of the tax system is low in 
developing countries and that tax administration is weak. Besides, spatially blind tax and transfer 
policies may not be good enough for forming the bedrock of public policies to integrate countries 
spatially and help them benefit from concentration and convergence. Depending on their 
conditions, nations need a broader range of instruments for domestic integration. The challenge 
of economic integration can be seen as reducing the distance between people – especially the 
poor – and economic opportunity. Misplaced population densities, and barriers to mobility of 
workers and entrepreneurs between leading and lagging areas posed by international divisions, 
complicate the challenge.  
In this regard, labour migration (both within and across countries) is a force behind cross-
regional economic growth and convergence of income and added value. Within countries, the 
accumulated empirical evidence shows that labour migration increases the earnings prospects of 
people who move. It also shows that labour migration contributes to aggregate growth by 
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improving the distribution of labour, driving concentration. And by clustering skills and talent, 
migration drives agglomeration spillovers.  
Whether couched in a classical framework or in the recent models of “endogenous 
growth,” where people are free to move, they will move to compete away differences in wages 
between locations. Since higher wages at the destination neglect an initial shortage of workers 
relative to capital – or a large endowment of capital per worker – the arrival of new migrants will 
slow the accumulation of capital per worker and the growth of wages. In contrast, the 
accumulation of capital per worker in the places migrants leave will speed up as they go, 
accelerating wage growth for workers who stay behind. By this mechanism, incomes in different 
locations are predicted to eventually converge.  
In a model that allow for labour mobility, raw labour tends to migrate toward richer 
economies, which have higher wage rates. This movement of persons lower the capital-labour 
ratio in places with initially high ratios; hence, diminishing returns to capital set in more rapidly 
and the convergence coefficient, B, is higher for any given parameters of preferences and 
technology. 
With trade, the mobility of people is probably the most potent mechanism for integrating 
areas of low economic density with markets of high density. But for internal migration to bring 
about a convergence in living standards, large population movements may be necessary over 
generations. 
The large differences in economic output will likely remain significant for some time. 
Among the main reasons are significant differences in the quality of domestic institutions, in the 
innovation dynamics of firms, and in the skills of the labour force. Assessing the benefits from 
integration thus requires a long time horizon, as increased labour mobility, investment in private 
and public capital, and other structural changes accelerate growth in lagging member countries. 
People moving to economically dense areas contribute to production and boost their 
incomes. But they also increase competition among workers in dense areas, reducing it in less 
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dense areas, and contributing to the convergence of living standards between low- and high-
productivity areas. Thus, labour mobility distributes labour from low- to high-wage 
administrative units, converging per capita incomes.  
Besides, human capital flows to economically leading places. At every spatial scale, 
migration is the way that people who invest in education and skills realize the returns on their 
investment. 
Comparable households enjoy much higher per capita spending if they migrate within 
their own district or to another district than if they stay in their native area. Therefore, in 
countries where lagging areas have large numbers of the poor, but few impediments to their 
mobility, institutions that promote mobility should be augmented by spatially connective 
infrastructure. Investments in infrastructure that increase the flow of goods, people and 
information would aid economic concentration and spatial convergence in living standards. 
Migration in the four CEE countries is not hampered by ethnic, confessional or linguistic 
differences, as after the World War II, the societies in the four nations became ethnically 
homogenous. 
Basic health and education indicators show improvements in almost all world regions, but 
there is some divergence in incomes between the richest and poorest regions. The human capital 
is also a development outcome that raises the quality of life for individuals. 
Economic development tends to be accompanied by an initial divergence in living 
standards between countries, followed by convergence.  
The increasing inequality between regions within a country reverses as lagging countries 
benefit from growth spillovers from leading countries. Some countries within a region may 
initially prosper more than others, but, in the long run living standards converge. 
Because poorer countries start from a far lower level, however, their percentage 
improvements are much higher, suggesting eventual convergence. 
 17 
Internationally, divergence in incomes continues for a while, and convergence is slowest. 
The stylized pattern of divergence followed by convergence is a hallmark of other modern-day 
developed countries. 
History points to persistent spatial divergence in living standards in today’s developed 
countries in their earlier stages of development, followed by slow convergence many years after 
they attained high income. 
Spatial disparities in living standards follow an inverted-U path, widening in the early 
stages of economic development, and remaining high for a long period before slowly 
converging. 
Second, in fast-growing regions, there initially is divergence as the leading regional 
economies pull away, but later there is convergence as poor countries benefit from growth 
spillovers and begin to catch up over time. 
The influences of history and specialization are consistent with the observed stability in 
the relative city-size distribution and the industrial concentration in specific cities over time. 
Within countries the relative sizes of cities tend to remain unchanged. Among urban specialists, 
this phenomenon is often represented as a recurring relationship between a city’s size relative to 
the largest city in the country, known as Zipf’s law: a city’s population size relative to the 
primate city is inversely proportional to its rank in the national hierarchy of cities. There is also 
persistence in the industrial concentration in specific cities.  
Adverse physical geography generally increases economic distance, reducing trade of 
goods and services and the flow of labour, capital and information, making delivery of public 
services harder. Connective infrastructure improvements are necessary for spatial integration. In 
addition, spatially blind education policies of improving schools can improve welfare in lagging 
areas. 
Falling transport costs bring closer economic integration within and between countries.  
The fall is caused by large infrastructure investments and breakthroughs in transport technology. 
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Massive investment in road construction completely changed interregional trade: they reduced 
intercity and interarea transport costs.  
Better transport technologies developed over the past two centuries have increased the 
volume of trade and radically altered its nature. Before World War I transport costs declined 
enough to make large-scale trade possible, but only between countries that were dissimilar. They 
happened to be countries that were distant, because big differences in climate and natural 
endowments usually meant the countries were in different parts of the world (Indonesia and the 
Netherlands, for example). During the second wave following World War II, transport costs fell 
enough for small differences in products and tastes to fuel trade. This lead to a rise in trade 
between countries that are similar (for instance, Argentina and Brazil), which often happen to be 
neighbours. As transport costs fall, physical geography matters less.  
A decline in transport costs – with increasing returns to scale – generally means more 
spatial concentration of production. Recent thinking in economics has emphasized the 
importance of transport costs in development. With high transport sots, large economies of scale 
will remain unexploited, and production inefficient. Efficient production is more specialized. 
When transport costs fall, spatial differences in production and economic growth will increase, 
both within and between countries.  
With falling domestic transport costs, economic production should have become more 
evenly spread within countries. With lower costs of transporting and communicating 
internationally, countries should have traded more with distant partners. What happened was the 
opposite. Falling transport costs have coincided with grater economic concentration within 
countries. And while countries now trade more with everyone – exports as a share of world 
production quadrupled to 25 percent over the last three decades – trade with neighbours became 
even more important. 
Why did this happen? The answer lies in the growing importance of scale economies in 
production and transport. As transport costs have fallen, they have allowed greater specialization 
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and radically altered the location of firms and the nature of trade. With high transport costs, 
firms had to be near consumers. But as transport costs fall, they can avail of internal, local, and 
urban economies of scale, and transport the product to consumers. Internationally, the same 
thing. With high transport costs, nations trade to fulfill basic needs and when transport costs fall, 
the trade switches to satisfy a variety of wants. 
Developing countries should pay more attention to transport and communications 
regulations to reduce transport and trade costs. The new economic geography had inadvertently 
contributed to an exclusive policy focus on “hard” infrastructure. The most critical policy-related 
aspects – the naturally monopolistic nature of transport – have been assumed away. Developing 
countries should do more to address the negative effects of market structure in the transport 
sector. 
The investment in domestic transport created large and integrated home markets. Tariff 
barriers remained low, and international trade benefited from technical and organizational 
progress. 
Regional transport infrastructure reduces the economic distance between trading partners, 
both within the neighbourhood and leading world markets. Like any other infrastructure, 
transport raises productivity. 
By upgrading and pooling infrastructure within a regional industrial development 
program, input costs could fall and cotton-based industries such as textile and garments could 
become competitive in the global market. Such an initiative would require a strong commitment 
from the participating countries and support from regional associations and the international 
community. 
By and large, transport infrastructure offers a range of methods to bridge the economic 
distance between leading and lagging areas. 
Recent research also explains two somewhat unexpected consequences of falling 
transport costs: (1) at the international level, trade infreases with nearby countries, not with those 
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farther away, and (2) within countries, improving transport infrastructure may lead to more 
concentration of economic activity, not less. 
Falling transport costs lead to concentration within countries. The productivity and 
income benefits of agglomeration, driven largely by lower transport costs, are often difficult for 
planners and policy makers to accept. But they explain the second counterintuitive implication of 
falling transport costs. There is a strong belief that an equal distribution of transport 
infrastructure will induce an equal geographic distribution of economic activities. High 
concentration is seen as a problem, and the spatial redistribution of economic mass is expected to 
promote overall development. Massive transport infrastructure investments have been the central 
policy instrument to induce firms to move to lagging regions. But the outcomes were usually the 
opposite – the target regions lost production and workers to the leading regions. 
Nationally, as leading and lagging areas within countries are connected through better 
modes of transport, production is more concentrated in the more economically dense areas to 
take advantage of agglomeration economies. 
This means more concentration within developing countries, but – by allowing them to 
specialize at earlier stages of development and exploit economies of scale – it will help them 
converge to the incomes and living standards in the developed world.  
Increasing returns to scale and spillovers from clustering – especially human capital-
related spillovers – make clear the growth and welfare payoffs of policies that facilitate 
movements of labour from lagging to leading places. The implications for policy are powerful. 
Rather than an impending destructive tide of humanity, the swelling flows of people from 
villages to cities could be a boon for economic growth and the convergence of welfare. Moving 
from the local spatial scale, no the national, and then to the international, the benefits from 
clustering are the same – and the problems facing policy makers grow and become more 
complex. Put plainly, they do not want to lose people and human capital. 
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This is nothing new. Production in today’s developed economies grew more concentrated 
until they reached high incomes. Concentration in Poland’s leading xxx. 
Each successful world region has, at some point, made significant and broad-based gains 
with basic labour-intensive manufacturing. This process initially led to a diversification of 
production as countries grew richer and consumers demanded more varieties. As economies in 
these regions expanded, production and employment in individual countries started to specialize 
in what they were best at, giving rise to interlinked networks or production trading intermediate 
goods among countries within the region. In countries that industrialized earlier, the service 
sector, including the research and design of products that will be manufactured elsewhere, now 
accounts for the largest share, by far, of employment and economic output.  
The opportunity is that, while spatial concentration remains beneficial for production, 
increasing specialization allows concentration and scale economies within subsectors in which 
even small players can carve out a niche. 
So, in rural areas, every additional worker, irrespective of innate talents or education 
attainment, has zero marginal productivity, but each potentially has a positive marginal 
productivity in manufacturing. This opens a gap in earnings and an incentive for labour to 
migrate from rural areas to cities in search of manufacturing jobs. Agriculture supplies an 
unlimited labour force to manufacturing, and the transfer of labour between the two sectors taken 
place through rural-urban migration. This migration continues until the “disguised 
unemployment” of workers in rural areas is absorbed into manufacturing in urban areas. 
2.2.7. Role of transport infrastructure 
One area in which macro-data may prove useful, is the study of how institutional, 
regulatory and political economy characteristics of countries or regions affect the amount and 
quality of infrastructure services provided at the sector level. In essence, researchers have been 
concerned with the timing of restructuring measures (before and after privatization), the 
implementation of regulation and, if so, the institutional aspects of it. 
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Persyn and Algoed (2009) opine that the effect of transfers which are able to increase 
infrastructure investment in backward regions cannot be predicted to foster growth and 
convergence. The authors find no clear-cut evidence that investment in transport infrastructure 
leads to higher growth in all regions or more so in initially poorer regions.  
In addition to production factors such as labour and private capital, transport 
infrastructure plays a role as an input in production processes. An improvement of transport 
infrastructure services implies that a regional economy can make use of its private production 
factors in a more productive way. Better transport infrastructure means: lower capital and labour 
needs to be able to reach the same production level. There are essentially two ways for analyzing 
the productivity gains induced by transport infrastructure improvements. The first one takes 
place at the firm level by measuring carefully the reductions in (transport) costs which can be 
achieved by infrastructure improvements. The second one occurs at the aggregate regional level 
by investigating the contribution of the production factor infrastructure to regional production 
taking into account the contribution of other production factors. This entails the use of regional 
production functions. 
2.2.8. Types of convergence 
If the dispersion – standard deviation of the logarithm of relative per capita income or 
product levels –tends to decline over time across regions (i.e. each region converges to a 
common rate or level), a so-called σ-convergence (dispersion) is observed.  
The existence of β-convergence will tend to generate declining dispersion or σ-
convergence. However, since the latter also depends on the variance of the error terms or 
“shocks”, this implies that although the long-term (steady-state) dispersion, falls with β (the 
strength of the convergence effect), it rises with the variance of the disturbance term. It is in this 
sense that β-convergence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for σ-convergence. 
Another theoretical framework narrates that differences across structurally dissimilar 
regions become stationary and growth rates converge in the long run. This is a case of 
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conditional β-convergence. Martin and Sunley (1998) argue that it is necessary to hold the steady 
state of each economy constant in order to test for conditional β-convergence. One method of 
doing this is to introduce additional structural variables in the basic growth regression. This 
method was used by Barro (1991), and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992).  
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Sala-i-Martin (1996) draw a useful distinction 
between two types of convergence in growth empirics: sigma (σ) convergence and beta (β) 
convergence. When the dispersion of real per capita income (henceforth, simply "income") 
across a group of economies falls over time, there is σ-convergence. When the partial correlation 
between growth in income over time and its initial level is negative, there is beta-convergence. 
Sala-i-Martin (1996) makes a distinction between conditional β-convergence (as described 
abotve) and unconditional (absolute) β-convergence, where poor economies simply grow faster 
than wealthy ones. 
 
The idea of unconditional β-convergence is at the core of the new endogenous growth 
theory. A standard model is developed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) for unconditional β-
convergence: 
(1/T) log(yit/yi,t - T) = α – [log(yi,t - T)](1 – e -βT) (1/T) + ui,t - T, t,  (1) 
where log(yit/yi,t - T) is the first lag of annualized rate of growth of output in region i over 
the study period between t - T and t; log(yit) is the logarithm of output in region i in the year t; ui,t 
- T is a distributed lag of the error terms, uit, between dates t - T and t; β is the convergence 
coefficient, which is the relative degree to which regions are said to converge absolutely when, 
in the long run, their wealth or output tends to equalize across them5. If 0 < β < 1, there is an 
absolute β-convergence and, vice versa, if -1 < β < 0, there is an absolute β-divergence. The 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s fundamental postulate is that the growth of low-income states exceeds 
that of higher income states1. 
5 Barro R.J., Sala-i-Martin X.X., ‘Convergence’. Journal of Political Economy, UChicago Press 1992, p. 228 
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The model does not include any shocks that normally have varying impact on different 
regions for several reasons. First of all, no major shocks were observed for the period of 1996-
2006: the global financial crisis spelt over the economic sector only in September 2008 and 
reached Central and Eastern Europe with a significant time lag – beyond the analyzed period. 
Secondly, the agricultural sector and/or oil production constitute a minor share in the structure of 
a Czech region and, thus, any changes in the relative prices of agricultural commodities could 
not have had any adverse effects on the income or product levels of a region relative to the 
incomes or products of other regions.  
Unequal distribution of population might lead to upward or downward bias of a disparity 
measure (Kessler, Lessman 2009). Fortunately, the classification of the Czech administrative 
units is the same for both the Czech National Statistical Office and the Eurostat Nomenclature of 
Territorial Units for Statistics classification level 2 (more known as NUTS 2).  
The model (1) is extended by Lall and Yilmaz (2000) who adopted the following 
specification: 
log(yi,t + T/yit) = α – β log(yit) + ckZki,t + diDi + T + eiTt + T + uit + T, (2) 
where “Z is a vector of k additional regional characteristics such as human capital and 
public capital; D is a vector of regional dummy variables with a set of regional coefficients di 
that can be interpreted as capturing specific regional characteristics; T is a vector of t time 
dummy variables included to capture trends in the economy, such that coefficients ei capture the 
time specific nature of the rate of growth of regional income per capita”6.  
Physical and human capitals are control variables that have been shown in the literature 
to impact regional disparity. Romer (1989) posited that educated and skilled labour force is able 
to use capital more efficiently and, thus, refuted the Cobb-Douglas idea of decreasing rates of 
return7. Investments in transport infrastructure (employed as a proxy for physical capital) are 
6 Lall S.V., Yilmaz S., ‘Regional economic convergence: do policy instruments make a difference?’. The annals of 
regional science, Springer 2001, p. 158 
7 Romer P.M., ‘Increasing returns and long-run growth’. The Journal of Political Economy, UChicago Press 1986, p. 
1004 
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also recognized as an important factor. The reasons for including transport variables are best 
summarized by Lall and Yilmaz (2000): “appropriate and efficiently supplied infrastructure has 
an inherent role in improving access to markets, reducing unit cost of production and generating 
consumer surplus by reducing cost of consumption, improving the general quality of life, as well 
as in attracting private investment”8.  
Transport infrastructure is not confined to roads, because the whole picture of its 
interactions with the development outcomes can be generated if airports, water- and railways are 
also included. 
The analysis is extended by disaggregating transport infrastructure into two groups: 
capital expenditures and operational expenditures on all means of transport. Capital expenditures 
(CapEx / new investments) contribute to the fixed infrastructure and are depreciating over time. 
They are needed to expand the services to users of public goods. Operational expenditures 
(OpEx / maintenance expenditures) do not contribute to the infrastructure themselves and, as 
such, are not subject to depreciation.  They represent the cost to keep transport infrastructure 
operating. According to Straub (2008), “one reason for that [structural decomposition] is the fact 
that the OPEX/CAPEX balance is likely to be crucially influenced by the amount of relative 
maintenance expenditures. Growth models imply that lower than optimal levels of maintenance 
expenditures will generate higher operational costs, both to run the infrastructure facilities and 
for private capital good that rely on them”9. 
The contribution of the above-mentioned production factors must be investigated, as the 
empirical evidence throughout the world has at best been mixed. In Italy, massive resources were 
transferred through a government-based channel, which contributed to developing regional 
infrastructure, including roads and schools, in the lagging South (so called “Mezzogiorno”), but 
the decades-long transfers did not change the position of the region relative to the national 
8 Lall S.V., Yilmaz S., ‘Regional economic convergence: do policy instruments make a difference?’. The annals of 
regional science, Springer 2001, p. 154 
9 Straub S., ‘Infrastructure and growth in developing countries: recent advances and recent challenges’. World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 2008, p. 17 
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average. The unemployment rate more than doubled till the end of 1980s, indicating a rapidly 
growing dependence of the South on fiscal transfers from the North10.  
3. Development of estimable model 
A linear model is developed to determine the relative impact of selected variables on the 
compound average growth rate of regional GVA per capita over the 1999-2006 period:  
(1) GROWTHi,t = β0 X0 – β1 GVAi,t-1 + β2 ROADi,t-1 + β3 HUMKi,t-1 + β4 LABOURi,t-1 + u, 
where the variables are: 
GROWTHi,t = growth rate of regional per capita GVA measured relative 
to national average; 
X0 = Constant term; 
GVAi,t-1 = Initial regional per capita GVA relative to national 
average; 
ROADi,t-1 = Growth rate of the length of roads in kilometers; 
HUMKi,t-1 = Growth rate of human capital measured by tertiary 
education (as percent of labour force); 
LABOURi,t-1 = Growth rate of labour force; 
t = Year of observation (1999 = 1 …2006 =9); 
u = Independently and identically distributed error term. 
 
The specification (1) is employed to test the link between increased transport 
infrastructure, human capital, net migration (proxied by the labour force) and convergence. 
One of the assumptions of Classical Linear Regression Model is that the sample means 
are normally distributed. The only way to guarantee this is for the distribution of the individual 
10 Faini R., Galli G., Giannini C., ‘Finance and development: the case of Southern Italy’, Finance and development: 
issues and experience’. Centre for Economic Policy Research 1993, p. 159 
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observations from the sample to be normal. To avoid skewness, the variables are logarithmically 
transformed. Table 1 shows positive signs for all coefficients of the explanatory variables:  
Table 1. Correlation matrix of regression variables: 
 
Growth of 
relative GVA  
per capita 
Relative GVA 
per capita in 
1999 
Growth of 
relative road 
length  
Growth of 
relative labour 
force 
Growth of 
relative human 
capital 
Growth of 
relative GVA  
per capita 1     
Relative GVA 
per capita in 
1999 0.2124 1    
Growth of 
relative road 
length  -0.6815 -0.1631 1   
Growth of 
relative labour 
force -0.2837 0.1249 -0.0485 1  
Growth of 
relative human 
capital -0.1684 -0.0689 -0.4262 0.2759 1 
 
The growth of relative GVA per capita has a strong negative correlation with the change 
in relative length of roads and, to less extent, with the growth of relative labour force and human 
capital. Interestingly, the relative length of roads is negatively correlated with the growth of 
relative human capital. 
The Graph 13 with a box plot below reveals the presence of outliers and/or influential 
observations in the cases of the relative GVA per capita in 1999 and relative growth of road 
length. 
Graph 1. Box plots of explanatory variables 
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Scatters of the afore-mentioned variables are plotted to further explore the potential 
outliers and/or influential observations. The abbreviations of the names of the regions are listed 
in Table 2 before the scatter plots. 
Table 2. Regions of four Central and Eastern European countries 
Czech Republic 
CZ01 - Praha 
CZ02 - Stredni Cechy 
CZ03 - Jihozapad 
CZ04 - Severozapad 
CZ05 - Severovychod 
CZ06 - Jihovychod 
CZ07 - Stredni Morava 
CZ08 - Moravoslezsko 
Hungary 
HU10 - Kosep-Magyarorszag 
HU21 - Kosep-Dunantul/Central 
Transdanubia 
HU22 - Nyugat-Dunantul/Western 
Transdanubia 
HU23 - Del-Dunantul/Southern 
Transdanubia 
HU31 - Eszak-Magyarorszag/Northern 
Hungary 
HU32 - Eszak-Alfold/Northern Great 
Plain 
HU33 - Del-Alfold/Southern Great Plain 
Poland 
PL11 - Lodzkie 
PL12 - Mazowieckie 
PL21 - Malopolskie 
PL22 - Slaskie 
PL31 - Lubelskie 
PL32 - Podkarpackie 
PL33 - Swietokrzyskie 
PL34 - Podlaskie 
PL41 - Wielkopolskie 
PL42 - Zachodniopomorskie 
PL43 - Lubuskie 
PL51 - Dolnoslaskie 
PL52 - Opolskie 
PL61 - Kujawo-Pomorskie 
PL62 - Warmino-Mazurskie 
PL63 - Pomorskie 
Slovakia 
SK01 - Bratislavsky Kraj 
SK02 - Zapadne Slovensko 
SK03 - Stredne Slovensko 
SK04 - Vychodne Slovensko 
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Figure 1. Regions of four Central and Eastern European countries 
 
Source: Map is adapted from the Eurostat. Author’s edition. See table 1 for names of regions 
 
Graph 2. Scatter plot of the growth rate of relative real GVA per capita and its 
initial level 
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Graph 3. Leverage-versus-residuals square plot of the growth rate of relative real 
GVA per capita and its initial level 
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As we can see, Prague (CZ01) and Bratislavsky Kraj (SK01) have both the largest 
leverage and residuals. This is confirmed by an added-variable plot below.  
Graph 4. Added-variable plot of the growth rate of relative real GVA per capita and 
its initial level 
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We can see how the regression line is trying to reach the extreme values of CZ01 and 
SK01. Many other observations also exert substantial leverage on the coefficient of the log of 
relative GVA per capita in 1999. Removing these influential points substantially changes the 
estimate of coefficients and the best-fit line. 
Graph 5. Added-variable plot of the growth rate of relative real GVA per capita and 
its initial level after removing influential points 
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The scatter and leverage-versus-residual square plots below show observations with high 
leverage represented by Hungarian regions (HU21-HU33) and residuals with, again, Prague 
(CZ01) and Bratislavsky Kraj (SK01).  
Graph 6. Scatter plot of the growth rates or relative real GVA per capita and 
relative length of roads 
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Graph 7. Leverage-versus-residuals square plot of the growth rates or relative real 
GVA per capita and relative length of roads 
CZ01CZ02CZ03CZ04CZ05 CZ06CZ07 CZ08
HU21 HU22
HU23
HU31
HU32
HU33
PL11PL12 PL21PL22 PL31PL32PL33PL34L41
PL4243
PL51 PL52
61 62L63 SK01SK02SK03SK04
0
.0
05
.0
1
.0
15
.0
2
Le
ve
ra
ge
0 .005 .01 .015
Normalized residual squared
 
 34 
Although leverage points can have an effect on the estimate of regression coefficients11, 
removing all Hungarian regions will render the estimation incomplete. Only observations for 
Prague (CZ01) and Bratislavsky Kraj (SK01) are dropped. 
As none of the variables in the regression shows near-perfect linear relationship between 
each other, the issue of multicollinearity is mitigated and all variables are included in the 
regression. Finally, the functional form of the model is correct, and the assumptions of the 
Classic Linear Regression Model are satisfied.  
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
The original sample consisted of 32 variables and 385 observations for the period 
between 1996 and 2006. As the variables are observed for most of the entities (regions) and most 
of the time periods (years), the longitudinal data is balanced. However, missing and non-evenly 
spaced data introduced some technical difficulties. For this reason, the initial period was 
increased from 1996 to 1999. The data were obtained from the following databases: Eurostat 
New Cronos, OECD and the World Bank World Development Indicators. The Eurostat NUTS 2 
territorial classification was preferred over the national statistical one as it is the lowest unit with 
available uniform data for most of the variables; “NUTS 1, a larger unit representing the major 
socioeconomic regions, often does not correspond to existing administrative units within 
member states”12. 
Previous researchers utilized different measures of wealth and output: regional personal 
income per head, regional gross value added, regional GDP per employee, and regional GDP per 
capita.  
Both the net disposable income of households and net balance of primary income were 
vetted as they do not give precise picture of one’s wealth. GDP per head was preferred to GDP 
as the differences in population growth across regions could have biased estimates. To neutralize 
11 http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/webbooks/reg/chapter2/statareg2.htm 
12 World Bank Group, ‘World Development Report 2009: Reshaping Economic Geography’. World Bank 
Publications 2008, p. 78 
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the impact of redistributory transfers (taxes and subsidies on products), the Gross Value Added 
was finally chosen as the basic variable13. The GVA was adjusted by the national GDP deflator 
with price bases varying for countries (‘single deflation’).  
The analysis includes in the regression human capital, migration and transport 
infrastructure. By consensus, human capital is measured either as the fraction of workforce that 
have at least started (but necessarily completed) secondary education (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
1990, La Fuente 1997), or as the share of workers who have accumulated some amount of 
college education (Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992), or as the ratio of university graduates per 
population (Fleisher, Chen 1996). The Mankiw et al. approach is adopted. 
Data on regional labour mobility to richer regions, which not only affects the speed of 
convergence, but also might create a force towards divergence14, is unavailable and, as such, is 
proxied by the number of employed workers. Transport infrastructure stocks were proxied by 
physical indicators of roads (in kilometres) as no capital or operational expenditures are at hand 
either. 
The expected sign of the coefficients is “-” for β1, β2, β3, and β4 because it is assumed that 
higher growth of transport infrastructure and human capital relative to the national average will 
let migrants more fully explore their options in places with higher wage premium, thus putting a 
downward pressure on the growth of GVA relative to the other regions. The data on the Czech, 
Hungarian, Polish and Slovak administrative units provided by the Eurostat and OECD are 
deemed to be reliable. 
5. Estimation and economic interpretation 
Table 2 shows regressions for the CEE administrative units over the 1996-2006 period. 
The regression in table 2 includes only a constant and log(yi,t – T) as independent variable. 
13 United Nations website. Price and Volume measures 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/sna1993/tocLev8.asp?L1=16&L2=5 
14 Barro R.J., Sala-i-Martin X.X., Blanchard O.J., Hall R.E., ‘Convergence across states and regions’. Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, The Brookings Institutions 1991, p. 111 
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Table 3. Regressions for the growth rate of relative real GVA per capitai and initial relative 
real GVA per capitaii across the four states, 1996-2006 
 
Table 4 presents the main results which show the role of changes in relative human 
capital, transport and migration – along with the initial GVA per capita – on the growth rate of 
relative GVA per capita in 35 administrative units of the four Central and Eastern European 
states for the 1999-2006 period. 
Table 4. Panel estimations: 
 Dependent variable: Growth of relative GVA per capita from 1999 to 2006 
 
Regressors (1) 
 
(2) 
 
Constant 
0.0247601*** 
(0.0020539) 
0.0324066*** 
(0.0024427) 
Relative GVA per capita in 1999 
-0.0022964*** 
(0.0004587) 
-0.0039912*** 
(0.0005442) 
Growth of relative road length 
-0.1636235*** 
(0.0051534) 
-0.1660021*** 
(0.0050384) 
Growth of relative labour force 
-0.2716506*** 
(0.0337139) 
-0.2356994*** 
(0.033493) 
Growth of relative human capital 
-0.2507467*** 
(0.0189286) 
-0.2688283*** 
(0.0187325) 
Number of observations 352 341 
R2 0.7713 0.7898 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis under the coefficients. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. The R2 statistic indicates the overall significance of the model. 
Sample Year βˆ  R
2 
Czech Republic 1996-2006 -0.0032425 
(0.0031871) 
0.0136 
[0.00108] 
- Regions 1996-2006 -0.0032425 
(0.0031871) 
0.0136 
[.00108] 
Hungary 1996-2006 0.0040304 
(0.000859) 
0.2269 
[0.00196] 
- Regions 1996-2006 -0.0051424 
(0.0010352) 
0.2783 
[0.00128] 
Poland 1996-2006 0.0017666 
(0.0003123) 
0.1554 
[0.00072] 
- Regions 1996-2006 0.0009944 
[0.0004003] 
0.0365 
[0.00072] 
Slovak Republic 1996-2006 0.0165771 
(0.0003524) 
0.9862 
[0.00018] 
- Regions 1996-2006 0.0165771 
(0.0003524) 
0.9862 
[0.00018] 
Sources: Author’s own calculations using the Eurostat New Cronos and OECD databases (various years). The codes 
in the figure are transcribed in Table 1. The nominal GVA figures are in millions of euro (from 1.1.1999)/millions of 
ECU (up to 31.12.1998) and are divided by the GDP deflator (with 2000 as base year for the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and the Slovak Republic, and 2002 as base year for Poland). The standard errors are shown in parenthesis. 
i. Growth is regional relative to national compound average annual growth rate of real GVA per capita between 
years t – T and t, measured in logarithm: (1/T) log (yit/yi,t-T). Both regional and national data are unweighted average 
values of the disaggregated data. 
ii. The log of initial real GVA per capita is regional real GVA per capita relative to the respective country mean. 
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Source: Eurostat New Cronos and OECD databases (various years) 
 
The OLS multiple linear regressions for all of the CEE administrative units (1) and CEE 
non-capital regions (2) show a strong (1% level of significance) negative relationship between 
the growth of relative GVA per capita and the growth of road length, percentage of workers with 
tertiary education, and migration relative to country means. These results comply with the Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin’ postulates that “poor economies tend to grow faster than rich ones, which 
corresponds to β > 0”15, and that “the migration of workers [proxied by the “labour force” 
variable – the Author] who quicken the process of convergence by moving to areas with higher 
capital-to-employee ratio16”. That is, new roads help workers migrate to areas with higher 
capital-to-employee ratio, thereby, curbing the growth of real GVA per capita.  
Both models have jointly significant regressors and strong explanatory power (0.7713 
and 0.7898). There are no unobserved characteristics and measurement errors as all observed 
variables are true. No lags of the dependent variable are among its regressors. Therefore, 
regressors and residuals are not correlated and the OLS estimators are consistent. 
Administrative units comprised of both capitals and regions diverge slower than the 
regions only. The same applies to the growth of road length and human capital. The only 
exception is that net influx of labour force to administrative unit has lower impact on regional 
divergence than on national one. All these developments suggest that in regions (mostly remote 
and disconnected from economic density), workers have less opportunities to use migration as a 
means to achieve higher level of wealth. 
To visualize the findings, figure 1 shows the pattern of beta-convergence of real per 
capita GVA across 8 Czech, 7 Hungarian, 16 Polish and 4 Slovak administrative units measured 
relative to their respective country means from 1999 to 2006.  
Graph 8. Convergence of Gross Value Added, administrative units relative to country 
means: log of 1996 per capita GVA and GVA growth from 1999 to 2006 
15 Barro R.J., Sala-i-Martin X.X., ‘Convergence’. Journal of Political Economy, UChicago Press 1992, p. 227 
16 Barro R.J., ‘Economic growth in a cross-section of countries’. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, The MIT 
Press 1991, pp. 407 
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The relationship between the two variables seems to be clustered by country. Therefore, it 
makes more sense to plot the variables on a national basis. Thus, Figure 2 gives more detailed 
analysis of beta-convergences by country. 
Graph 9. Convergence of Gross Value Added, administrative units relative to country 
means: log of 1999 per capita GVA and GVA growth from 1999 to 2006 
 Growth rate of relative per capita GVA, 1999-2006 
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Contrary to the expected, more developed regions – Kosep-Magyarorszag, Mazowiecke 
and Zapadne Slovensko – have higher growth despite already having high relative real GVA per 
head in 1999. All four nations exhibit some form of divergence. While the administrative units of 
the four CEE states appear to be converging among each other, slowly forming a ‘convergence 
club’, on a national level, they are diverging. 
The relationship between the growth rates of relative real regional GVA per capita and 
relative regional human capital is steady in the Czech Republic, negative in Hungary and Poland, 
and strongly positive in the Slovak Republics. 
Graph 10. Scatter plot of the growth rates of relative real regional GVA per capita 
and human capital, by country 
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The relationship between the growth rates of real GVA per capita and the relative length 
of roads is positive in Poland, and negative in Hungary and very negative in the Czech and 
Slovak Republics. 
Graph 11. Scatter plot of the growth rates of GVA per capita and the length of 
roads on a national level 
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The relationship between the growth rates of GVA per capita and labour force is quite 
steady in the Czech Republic and Poland, and positive in Hungary and the Slovak Republic 
Graph 12. Scatter plot of the growth rates of relative real GVA per capita and the 
relative labour force on a national level 
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Table 4 shows the decomposition of an administrative unit i’s per capita GVA into eight 
standard sectors: public administration, financial intermediation/real estate, services, trade, 
construction, mining and agriculture. Services, industry and mining constitute the three largest 
sectors of a given economy (except for Poland, where trade is larger than mining). 
Table 5. Sector shares in GVA (percent) 
Sector Year Czech 
Republic 
Hungary Poland Slovak 
Republic 
Public adm. 1996 8.006676 11.62069 10.44525 8.500924 
FIRE 1996 6.986439 8.867449 5.870866 7.843662 
Services 1996 26.31796 30.37442 30.79873 29.01145 
Trade 1996 11.32467 9.886739 14.48237 12.66647 
Construction 1996 4.288979 2.177744 3.289625 3.807123 
Industry 1996 22.38421 16.80331 16.67919 19.59057 
Mining 1996 18.09543 14.62502 13.38962 15.78371 
Agriculture 1996 2.595637 5.644617 5.044355 2.79609 
Public adm. 2006 8.719554 12.15412 10.36572 8.168815 
FIRE 2006 7.155552 9.261242 8.517689 8.168815 
Services 2006 28.18105 30.57943 33.07586 29.60917 
Trade 2006 12.30585 9.164181 14.19263 12.3843 
Construction 2006 3.270499 2.662553 3.125876 4.066135 
Industry 2006 21.0863 17.79938 15.60733 19.44915 
Mining 2006 17.81574 15.13696 12.48159 15.38285 
Agriculture 2006 1.465456 3.242142 2.633308 1.883766 
Public 
administration: 
Public administration and defence, compulsory social security; education; health and social work; 
other community, social and personal service activities; private households with employed 
persons 
FIRE: Financial intermediation; real estate, renting and business activities 
Services: Services (excluding extra-territorial organizations and bodies) 
Trade: Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household 
goods; hotels and restaurants; transport, storage and communication 
Mining: Mining and quarrying; electricity, gas and water supply 
Agriculture: Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 
 
The share of relative real GVA per capita generating from the economic sector of public 
administration rose in the Czech Republic and Hungary, but fell in Poland and the Slovak 
Republic. FIRE and, especially, services had their contribution to GVA increased in all four 
countries. The share of GVA from trade rose everywhere, except for the Czech Republic. The 
portion of construction rose only in Hungary and the Slovak Republic. The share of industry fell 
in the Czech Republic, Poland and the Slovak Republic (albeit slightly). The part of mining 
decreased in the Czech Repubic and Poland, rose in Hungary and (slightly) decreased in the 
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Slovak Republic. The portion of agriculture dwindled in all four economies. All in all, we can 
observe the process of reallocation of productive capital from one group of economic sectors, 
like agriculture, industry and mining, to another – trade, financial intermediation and real estate. 
Thus, the four CEE states are heading to the post-industrial structure of their economies. 
Table 5 shows sector productivity in 1996, 2006 and the growth between these two years. 
We can see that in the Czech Republic, construction, industry, mining and agriculture exhibited 
negative growth. In the Slovak Republic, only industry and mining had stagnated by the end of 
the period. Hungary and Poland represent contrasting examples: the former country showed 
productivity growth in all the sectors of the economy, whereas the latter one showed decline in 
productivity in all sectors (except for the financial intermediation/real estate).   
Table 6. Log of sector productivity and its growth 
Sector Year Czech 
Republic 
Hungary Polandi Slovak 
Republic 
Growth of 
sectoral 
productivity: 
     
- Public 1996 (/98) – 2006 .0040498 .0039705 -.0011984 .0049652 
- FIRE 1996 (/98) – 2006 .007763 .0083014 .0050246 .0203993 
- Services 1996 (/98) – 2006 .0048508 .0043559 -.0008615 .0063246 
- Trade 1996 (/98) – 2006 .0077594 .0053604 -.0039355 .006804 
- Construction 1996 (/98) – 2006 -.0308607 .0110034 -.0244685 . 
- Industry 1996 (/98) – 2006 -.0093802 .0034777 -.0063821 -.0076702 
- Mining 1996 (/98) – 2006 -.0089858 .0036641 -.0061398 -.0117006 
- Agriculture 1996 (/98) – 2006 -.0062909 .7566215 -.0670388 .0242731 
Log of sectoral 
productivity: 
     
- Public 1996 (/98) 1.632906 1.701733 2.11975 1.483012 
- FIRE 1996 (/98) 1.444558 1.415441 1.812452 1.391872 
- Services 1996 (/98) 2.813913 2.660608 3.289544 2.708549 
- Trade 1996 (/98) 1.973967 1.537885 2.505184 1.879476 
- Construction 1996 (/98) 1.006893 .0301654 1.129479 .6727378 
- Industry 1996 (/98) 2.643766 2.056039 2.65125 2.307708 
- Mining 1996 (/98) 2.419481 1.91116 2.402845 2.089495 
- Agriculture 1996 (/98) .1581277 .7845938 1.088146 .2248731 
Log of sectoral 
productivity: 
     
- Public 2006 1.686523 1.793363 2.096996 1.441239 
- FIRE 2006 1.430528 1.510149 1.896081 1.509579 
- Services 2006 2.852315 2.721457 3.264126 2.718669 
- Trade 2006 2.02628 1.51455 2.417836 1.851794 
- Construction 2006 .7018789 .2781997 .9037532 .7118182 
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- Industry 2006 2.53844 2.157582 2.502795 2.272875 
- Mining 2006 2.356521 1.981391 2.273283 2.028278 
- Agriculture 2006 -.3682425 .2194612 .5827191 -.1899779 
i. Poland does not have observations for the ‘labour force’ variable and, consequently, for the contribution of sectors 
to GVA per worker for 1996, but only starting from 1998. 
 
Table 6 below shows sectoral breakdown of national employment in the four CEE states. 
In the Czech Republic, labour force had flown from the same sectors that had negative 
productivity growth. In Hungary, the share of workers employed in industry and agriculture had 
decreased by 2006. Sectoral employment in the Polish economy followed the same development 
path as the Czech Republic did. In the Slovak Republic, part of human resources moved from 
industry, agriculture and public administration to financial intermediation/real estate, services, 
trade and construction. The common feature of the four CEE states is that the share of persons 
employed in industry and agriculture relative to labour force in other sectors of economy was 
higher in 1999 (or in 2000 in the case of Poland and the Slovak Republic) than in 2006. It is 
needless to mention that these very sectors have negative growth of productivity relative to the 
other sectors. The ingenious market appears to be directing the labour resources to the more 
efficient sectors! 
Table 7. Sector shares in employment (percent) 
Sector Year Czech 
Republic 
Hungary Polandi Slovak 
Republici 
Growth of 
sectoral share 
of employment: 
     
- Public 1999 (/00) – 2006 .0083918 .0018005 .0044374 -.0087625 
- FIRE 1999 (/00) – 2006 .0142747 .0289258 .0267098 .0349608 
- Services 1999 (/00) – 2006 .0030613 .0049651 .0051345 .0013724 
- Trade 1999 (/00) – 2006 -.0053526 .0021558 -.0004343 .0017081 
- Construction 1999 (/00) – 2006 -.1199831 .025337 -.0219505 .0290998 
- Industry 1999 (/00) – 2006 -.0025879 -.0159401 -.0039069 -.0036747 
- Agriculture 1999 (/00) – 2006 -.0411265 -.0443918 -.0154091 -.0583711 
Sectoral shares 
in employment: 
     
- Public 1999 (/00) .1411169 .1651744 .1497834 .1727915 
- FIRE 1999 (/00) .0471872 .0365994 .0390835 .0438924 
- Services 1999 (/00) .349448 .3586592 .3335552 .3669147 
- Trade 1999 (/00) .1611558 .1568644 .1446848 .1503065 
- Construction 1999 (/00) .1611558 .0424983 .0476854 .0493826 
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- Industry 1999 (/00) .2057588 .1889052 .1562278 .1776595 
- Agriculture 1999 (/00) .0339872 .0512992 .1289799 .0390527 
Sectoral shares 
in employment: 
     
- Public 2006 .1508737 .1675686 .1544983 .1624675 
- FIRE 2006 .0528529 .0459776 .0470032 .0558286 
- Services 2006 .3580983 .3731555 .3457299 .3704541 
- Trade 2006 .1543829 .1595902 .1442455 .1521129 
- Construction 2006 .0579661 .0519164 .0408236 .0603638 
- Industry 2006 .2015373 .1661178 .152005 .1731396 
- Agriculture 2006 .0242888 .0356738 .1156945 .0256336 
i. Both Poland and the Slovak Republic have observations for relative sectoral shares in employment and, 
consequently, for the growth of relative sectoral share of employment only starting from 2000. 
6. Conclusion 
Although the examined period is relatively short (9 years of balanced data set), the 
findings support the hypothesis that new roads help workers migrate to areas with higher capital-
to-employee ratio, thereby, putting a cap on the growth of real GVA per capita. In regions 
(mostly remote and disconnected from economic density), workers have less opportunities to use 
migration as a means to achieve higher level of wealth. 
While the administrative units of the four CEE states appear to be converging among 
each other, slowly forming a ‘convergence club’, on a national level, they showed divergence 
from 1999 to 2006. The Slovak Republic is the only country to show steady convergence at the 
well-known Sala-i-Martin’s “2 percent”. 
Changing pattern of sectoral share of GVA per worker suggests the process of the 
reallocation of productive capital from one group of economic sectors, like agriculture, industry 
and mining, to another – trade, financial intermediation and real estate. Thus, the four CEE states 
are heading to the post-industrial structure of their economies. Besides, the common feature of 
the four CEE states is that the share of persons employed in industry and agriculture relative to 
the labour force in other sectors of economy had declined by 2006. The same sectors had 
negative growth of productivity relative to the other sectors. Instead, the sectors with higher 
growth of productivity relative to the other parts of economy increased the share of employees 
working for “this” particular sector. 
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Nevertheless, the findings and model should not be overestimated as there could have 
been a measurement error. The nominal values of gross value added of each region were deflated 
by the national GDP deflator – instead of unavailable deflators for individual administrative 
units. If relative purchasing power parity was unequal across the administrative units, then the 
growth rates of relative real GVA per capita could have been measured incorrectly. Moreover, 
physical indicators are not very good proxies for infrastructure, mostly because much of 
resources are spent on maintaining roads rather than expanding them. 
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9. Annex 
OLS linear multiple regression: 
                                                                              
       _cons     .3437892   .1998925     1.72   0.089    -.0535187    .7410971
    lopexlag     .0117194   .0055302     2.12   0.037     .0007275    .0227112
       dummy    -.0108145   .0061903    -1.75   0.084    -.0231183    .0014894
  llabourlag     .0104568   .0084784     1.23   0.221    -.0063949    .0273086
    lhumklag     .0800742   .0256797     3.12   0.002      .029033    .1311153
  loutputlag    -.0563794   .0200782    -2.81   0.006    -.0962869   -.0164719
                                                                              
     lgrowth        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .057940096    92  .000629784           Root MSE      =  .02339
                                                       Adj R-squared = 0.1311
    Residual     .04760678    87  .000547204           R-squared     =  0.1783
       Model    .010333317     5  .002066663           Prob > F      =  0.0038
                                                       F(  5,    87) =    3.78
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     93
. reg lgrowth  loutputlag lhumklag llabourlag dummy lopexlag
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .4290989   .2290741     1.87   0.064    -.0261377    .8843356
   lcapexlag     .0167894   .0075331     2.23   0.028     .0018189      .03176
       dummy    -.0057082   .0057021    -1.00   0.320    -.0170399    .0056234
  llabourlag     .0035292   .0101347     0.35   0.728    -.0166113    .0236698
    lhumklag     .0569313   .0265548     2.14   0.035     .0041593    .1097033
  loutputlag    -.0583566   .0208434    -2.80   0.006    -.0997785   -.0169347
                                                                              
     lgrowth        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     .05830323    93  .000626916           Root MSE      =  .02337
                                                       Adj R-squared = 0.1288
    Residual    .048060951    88  .000546147           R-squared     =  0.1757
       Model    .010242278     5  .002048456           Prob > F      =  0.0040
                                                       F(  5,    88) =    3.75
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     94
. reg lgrowth  loutputlag lhumklag llabourlag dummy lcapexlag
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